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Abstract
In this article we analyze the interdependent issues of urbanization, growth, and
globalization by presenting key empirical facts and relevant underlying economic
theories on each. We look more closely, but without providing a detailed formal
analysis, at a model by Baldwin and Forslid (2000) that combines a seminal model
from the endogenous growth literature (Romer 1990) with one from the new eco-
nomic geography literature (Krugman 1991). In the analysis the significance of a
sophisticated consideration of the concept of integration is pointed out. We investi-
gate the issue of scale, scale economies, and density and the important role integra-
tion plays in these considerations as well. We especially argue that future research
should more precisely focus on integration as a dynamic concept that does not only
affect agglomeration and growth, but which is itself the endogenous outcome of
various interdependencies and which complements the institutional settings of the
territories that are linked to each other.
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1 Introduction
The 2009 World Development Report by the World Bank opens with the statement
“Production concentrates in big cities, leading provinces, and wealthy nations. Half
the world’s production fits onto 1.5 percent of its land” (World Bank 2009, xiii). This
immense concentration of economic activity has its counterpart in the fact that urban
areas currently account for more than 50% of the global population (United Nations,
2012). Economic activity and people are thus unlikely to be randomly distributed across
space. Together these facts indicate the existence of benefits from concentration. These
benefits are well known and date back to Marshall (1890) and his description of ex-
ternal economies. More specifically, these can be broken down to market size effects
operating through forward and backward linkages, thick labor markets, and pure ex-
ternal economies like, for example, knowledge spillovers (Krugman 1998). However,
if only these agglomeration forces were at work, the implication was that the whole
world would end up in one gigantic agglomeration. In effect, these forces that are
conducive to agglomeration are balanced by a variety of dispersion forces like the exis-
tence of land rents or pure external diseconomies (e.g. pollution, crime). The resulting
economic landscape is the outcome of the tension between these opposing forces.1
In addition to this concentration of economic activity, recent economic history over
approximately the past 70 years is furthermore characterized by the ongoing process of
globalization in its various forms as well as by an unprecedented increase in per capita
income levels. Agglomeration and growth are connected via integration (globalization)
to each other. In this paper we present key empirical facts on each aspect and comment
on some important models in the theoretical literature concerning these. We look in
more detail, but without delving deep into the formal analysis, at a model by Baldwin
and Forslid (2000) that combines an endogenous growth model of the Romer (1990)
variety with a new economic geography model along the lines of Krugman (1991).
This combined model incorporates all three characteristics of interest and also allows
for a more sophisticated consideration of the impact of integration on agglomeration
than is the case in traditional new economic geography models. The reason is that it
not only considers the costs of trading goods, but also accounts for the costs of trading
information, a lowering of which tends to weaken the agglomeration forces. A detailed
understanding of the concept of economic integration is particularly relevant, as it is
the “way to get both the immediate benefits of the concentration of production and the
long-term benefits of a convergence in living standards” (World Bank 2009, 1).
The issue of size and scale economies, and the role integration plays herein is impor-
1Expressed differently, these forces are second-nature determinants for location decisions in contrast
to first-nature or exogenous determinants like natural resources, climate or natural harbors.
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tant in these considerations. For instance, the implication of many endogenous growth
models that larger economies exhibit higher growth rates is not necessarily born out
empirically (Jones 1995b). Another aspect is that scale economies might not be rel-
evant at all levels of aggregation (i.e. city, region, nation). We especially argue that
future research should more precisely focus on integration as a dynamic concept that
does not only affect agglomeration and growth, but which is itself the endogenous out-
come of various interdependencies and which complements the institutional settings of
the territories that are linked to each other.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts and theoretical
issues on agglomeration, growth, and globalization. In Section 3 a model by Baldwin
and Forslid (2000) is described that links these aspects. Section 4 deals with the issue
of scale, size, and density while Section 5 derives policy implications from the insights
of the previously presented arguments. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks and
perspectives for future research.
2 Building blocks
2.1 Spatial concentration
The earliest urban structures date back to the time of the Neolithic Revolution (Bairoch
1988). Prior to the Industrial Revolution, however, “the urban way of life had for
thousands of years been the exception, it now became the rule” (Bairoch 1988, 213).
This tendency towards increasing urbanization continues today and reflects an ongoing
global pattern as can be seen in Figure 1, which illustrates a positive trend that is
expected to last during the next several decades.2 Though the trend is global, there are
marked differences between the various ‘global regions’. Western Europe, the United
States and Australia have crossed the threshold of more than half of the respective
population living in urban areas before 1950 and now have urbanization rates between
75% and 90%. Africa and Asia on the other hand had urbanization rates of ca. 15% in
2The coarse aggregation scheme is chosen to ensure comparability of urbanization rates and GDP per
capita throughout the subsequent section. Since there is no perfect overlap in data availability as regards
urbanization rates (Figure 1) and growth (Figure 2), we adopt the notion of ‘global regions’ from the
United Nations World Urbanization Prospect and apply it to the New Maddison Project Database (Bolt
and van Zanden 2013). Details on this can be found in Appendix A. In Figure 1, the concept of ‘urban
population’ is based on the definitions of the respective national statistical agencies and thus may vary
across regions. For an alternative agglomeration measure that aims at enabling cross-country compara-
bility see Uchida and Nelson (2010). Note also that the population forecasts (from 2012 onwards (United
Nations 2012)) depend upon national census data that are also only comparable with restrictions.
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1950 and are expected to cross the value of 50% in 2035 and 2020, respectively. Latin
America has followed yet another path. It reached an urbanization rate of 50% in the
early 1960s, had a higher rate than Western Europe in 2000, and currently has a rate
of nearly 80%.
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Figure 1: Urban population by major geographical area.
Note: The data are from United Nations (2012). See Appendix A for a list of geographical entities
included in the aggregates.
These numbers for the urbanization rate provide little information however on whether
people are living in large cities of several million people or if they are living in com-
paratively small cities of a few hundred thousand inhabitants. Table 1 remedies this
situation to some extent by distinguishing the absolute number of urban residents ac-
cording to five city-size classes.3 What can then be inferred from combining the data in
Figure 1 and Table 1 is that not only are more and more people living in cities, but they
are also increasingly living in large cities. In 1970, for instance, approximately 14%
3Note that, since the entries in Table 1 are absolute numbers of urban residents, the data offers
only limited information about the number of cities in each group. The 630 million people, who are
forecasted to live in cities of over 10 million residents in 2025 might, for instance, be distributed more or
less evenly over some 60 cities or on the other hand be concentrated in a few gigantic cities of 50 million
residents and many comparatively small ones with “only” approximately 10 million residents. Any other
combination that distributes 630 million residents over a number of cities with a minimum size of 10
million is also possible. More details on the city-size distribution can be found in (Gabaix and Ioannides
2004).
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of the world’s population lived in cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants, whereas the
corresponding figure was approximately 26% in 2011 and will rise to approximately
33% in 2025.4
The share of the urban population living in cities with less than 500,000 inhabitants
is forecasted to fall by 20 percentage points from 62% in 1970 to 42% in 2025, but
the share of urban residents in cities with more than 10 million inhabitants is expected
to increase from 3% to 14% over the same period. Combining these aspects with the
empirical evidence on city-size distributions implies the emergence and even intensifi-
cation of core-periphery structures at various levels of spatial scale.
Table 1: Evolution and forecast of total population in millions according to city-size classes.
< 0.5m 0.5-1m 1-5m 5-10m >10m
1970 833 128 244 109 39
1990 1333 206 456 142 145
2011 1849 365 776 283 359
2025 1966 516 1129 402 630
Note: The data are from United Nations (2012).
In other words, the trend of ongoing concentration may be observed at different levels
of spatial aggregation. Brakman et al. (2009, 13) neatly summarize this phenomenon
by stating: “It appears that the highly uneven distribution of economic activity across
space has a fractal dimension – that is, it repeats itself at different levels of aggregation.”
Put differently, ongoing concentration might be observed across several spatial scales
whereupon from a global perspective the resulting core-periphery structure remains
unchanged.
These facts on urbanization are strong indicators for the existence of ‘local’ scale ef-
fects. The resulting spatial pattern is the outcome of the location decisions of firms and
households, and the underlying economic reasoning may be summarized as follows:
Individuals are indifferent as regards relocation if benefits and costs are equalized. In
other words, for any degree of aggregation a spatial equilibrium is reached whenever
forces attracting people (so-called agglomeration forces) and those pushing off people
(dispersion forces) are balanced.5 From a slightly different perspective, a location may
be attractive for people or firms due to characteristics that are external to these actors.
4The shares are calculated from the data in United Nations (2012, Figure II and Table A.5).
5This argument holds with the caveat that in formal theoretical models it is only valid for interior
equilibria, but not for equilibria in which complete agglomeration occurs.
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The associated (external or) agglomeration economies that act as attractors for firms
and individuals to a certain place date back to the seminal work of Marshall (1890),
who identified three main sources of spatial concentration processes:6 (i) Market-size
effects: Local concentration leads to large local markets and vice versa. Via ‘forward’
or ‘cost linkages’ a local concentration benefits both consumers, who profit from more
varieties and lower prices, as well as firms, since the local production of intermediate
goods reduces the costs of downstream producers. On the other hand, firms gain from
producing in a large market with good access to customers (‘backward’ or ‘demand
linkages’). (ii) Thick labor markets ease the matching problem between supply and de-
mand of (today frequently specialized) labor. (iii) (Pure) external economies that are the
more distinct the more densely populated a region is, since proximity allows for more
frequent interaction and increased information spillovers. Infrastructure fixed costs are
also spread over more heads. These forces mostly cover specialization advantages as
the considered actors can benefit from scale economies and the related cost decreases,
which usually are meant to apply within single sectors.7
Equally important for the attractiveness of a certain location, though not specifically
mentioned in the context of Marshall’s triad, are: (iv) Selection effects that occur in
highly competitive markets where only efficiently working firms are able to survive.
This effect is reinforced, since efficiency acts as an attraction point for internationally
mobile capital and/or frequently highly qualified labor. (v) Diversity: Especially in light
of the aforementioned increase of large urban agglomerations (Table 1), it is quite
reasonable that the economic centers are not only characterized by specialization in a
single but in several different fields at the same time. Groups of interconnected compa-
nies together with the supporting institutions, which are all located close to each other,
are frequently said to form a cluster (Porter 1990). In particular, if several clusters are
co-located, it is not just specialization, but in contrast the opportunity to interact with
various – also heterogeneous – actors that attracts new firms and people. In this con-
nection, Jacobs (1969) was the first to point to the positive effect of the co-location of
diverse actors.8 The resulting productivity and consumption economies are associated
6In this context, Alfred Marshall shaped the notion of the ‘industrial districts’ – a formulation that
must be understood in light of the 19th century’s economic conditions. The basic mechanisms, however,
are still valid today only that aside from the industrial sector an important share of value creation is
realized within the service sector. Marshall’s concept has been picked up by Arrow (1962) and Romer
(1986), who introduced it in theoretical models. As a consequence, agglomeration economies that are
related to spillovers and (industry) specialization are mostly denoted as Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR)
externalities; see also Krugman (1998) for a compact overview.
7Considering current production conditions, this includes the service sector and the joint use of
research infrastructure.
8The associated external effects are nowadays called Jacobs or urbanization externalities (thus being
distinguished from the previously mentioned MAR or specialization/localization externalities).
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with the diversity and intensity of economic activity. In addition, large agglomerations
also are more efficient in solving the matching problem that may arise in the factor mar-
kets thus linking the reasoning to the aforementioned thick labor markets and adapting
them to a more dynamic environment that also might account for structural change. It
is therefore reasonable to assume that as a consequence of ‘density’, the corresponding
region’s productivity increases and thereby drives local productivity above average.
But if only agglomeration forces were at work, the spatial equilibrium would result
in a unique agglomeration of economic activity thus contradicting the empirical facts
summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1. In fact, there exist opposing dispersion forces that
are mainly based on the following sources: (i) Immobile factors such as land, natural
resources, but also workers, imply that industries have to some extent go to where
factors and their owners are located. At the same time, institutional arrangements may
also foster or hamper the mobility of factors. Two arbitrary descriptive examples are
the four freedoms within the EU or the necessity of work permits for non-residents in
the US. (ii) Land rents increase as a result of concentration both for producing firms,
but also for private individuals, who seek to minimize commuting costs. In the extreme,
increasing land rents may even lead to the relocation of economic activity not only from
the core to peripheral regions, but also as regards the location of different operating
areas of firms within urbanized areas (functional specialization, Duranton and Puga
2000). (iii) (Pure) external diseconomies of scale such as congestion, pollution, and
crime also hamper concentration.
As argued before, a spatial equilibrium is reached when both, agglomeration and dis-
persion forces, are balanced. Ongoing urbanization in this context implies the emer-
gence and reinforcement of core-periphery structures in economies with increasing
population size. In Section 4 we relate the identified core-periphery structures more
precisely to scale effects and size in growing economies.
2.2 Growth and prosperity
Aside from the spatial concentration of population and production at certain locations,
another major trend since the era of industrialization is ongoing economic growth as
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Figure 2 depicts GDP per capita
based on 1990 international dollars9 for the period 1850-2010 and strikingly high-
lights the world-wide growth story for the same major global regions as in the last
9In this unit 1 international dollar has the same purchasing power as $1 US had in 1990, and the
GDP per capita values in other currencies are adjusted by purchasing power parities. Keeping in mind
the difficulties of estimating these time series (see e.g. Bolt and van Zanden (2013)), it is nonetheless to
a certain degree possible to compare the values across time and countries.
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Subsection 2.1.10 Around the world, centuries of Malthusian stagnation in which per
capita income was near the subsistence level precede the Industrial Revolution until
economies entered a period of sustained economic growth.11 The positive trend might
already be discerned in the 19th century. However, the effect of exponential growth be-
comes distinctly visible after World War II, though there are clear differences between
the various illustrated global regions.
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Figure 2: GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars.
Note: The data are from the New Maddison Project Database (Bolt and van Zanden 2013). See
Appendix A for a list of geographical entities included in the aggregates.
The dominating positive trend for the global regions tends to hide drastic differences
in income at the less aggregated level of individual countries. At the top, the USA has a
GDP per capita of $30,491 in 2010 while the poorest country in the Maddison sample
in that year is the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a GDP per capita of $260.
Another noteworthy characteristic of the data is the possibility that a laggard overtakes
the leader in the GDP per capita ranking (‘leapfrogging’). This is exemplified by the
USA becoming richer than the previous leader Australia in 1899.12
10The New Maddison Project Database provides information on the economic performance of coun-
tries and geographic regions from the year 1 onwards (at least for a subset of countries). The selected
regions were chosen to allow for an immediate comparison to Figure 1.
11See, for instance, Galor (2005, 2011) and the references therein for empirical evidence and a theo-
retical model explaining this transition to sustained growth.
12For additional empirical evidence on the changing leaders and laggards for the period 1-2003,
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The pattern of ongoing growth in Figure 2 has been accompanied by additional eco-
nomic regularities. Kaldor (1957, 591) stated for capitalist economies that there are
“remarkable historical constancies revealed by recent empirical investigations.” His
observations led to the nowadays well recognized ‘stylized facts of growth’ (Kaldor
1961).13 At the same time, these observations set the frame for a research agenda to
develop a consistent, comprehensive theory, which led to the neoclassical growth model
(Solow 1956, Swan 1956). Based on the empirical observation of ongoing economic
growth – often interpreted as increasing prosperity that in turn allows for a life above
subsistence level – economic theory in general tries to gain a deeper understanding of
the driving forces of this process. The major goal is to identify the underlying determi-
nants, to comprehend their interaction, and, given any indications for forces hampering
this process (e.g. market failures), to derive appropriate policy recommendations in or-
der to maximize overall welfare. Growth thereby refers to the evolution of the GDP per
capita, mostly analyzed at the country level, which results from the accumulation and
use of more and/or better inputs in the production process. Across time and in spite
of its rich explanatory power of the stylized facts detailed in Footnote 13, the neoclas-
sical growth model has been criticized with respect to several dimensions (e.g. Jones
and Romer 2010). It only covers one state variable, namely physical capital. The lack-
ing microfoundations imply an exogenously assumed savings rate, since the resulting
growth rate is not derived from individual optimization behavior. The model is also
not able to explain the variation of growth rates between countries. In the model’s
equilibrium, growth per capita comes to a standstill with the consequence that the
empirically observed positive growth rates can only be explained by exogenous tech-
nological progress. Due to its specification, technological change naturally remains a
black box so that ultimately no clear-cut policy recommendation can be derived from
the model in this respect.
Solow’s basic growth model set the ground for several extensions, among them the in-
clusion of human capital or productive governmental activity. Further efforts led to the
emergence of endogenous growth theory in the mid 1980s, which also provided insights
into the utility maximization–growth nexus (i.e. the derived aggregate growth rate is
based on individual optimization decisions (microfoundations)) thereby especially ad-
dressing the role of technological progress, human capital accumulation, or the role of
institutions. Recent discussions of growth theorists distinguish ‘proximate’ from ‘funda-
compare e.g. Figure 9 in Brakman and van Marrewijk (2008).
13In detail, the Kaldor facts are the following: (i) Labor productivity has grown at a steady rate,
(ii) capital per worker has continually increased, (iii) the real interest rate (return on capital) has been
stable, (iv) the capital-output ratio has been constant, (v) the shares of capital and labor in national
income have been stable, and (vi) among the fastest growing countries the growth rate has varied in the
range of 2.5%.
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mental’ causes of growth. The latter cover conditions such as luck, geography, culture,
and institutions while the former refer to production inputs such as physical and hu-
man capital as well as to their overall productivity, which is enhanced by technological
progress.14
These new theoretical frameworks have now themselves undergone an empirical as-
sessment. Again the goal has been to review whether or not they are suited to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the empirical facts and thus to link theory and
empirical research within a consistent framework. Jones and Romer (2010) recently
revisited the aforementioned Kaldor facts and updated them thereby also accounting
for structural change of the last five decades.15 Summarizing these findings leads to the
recognition that in order to match the requirements of today’s empirical results and to
develop a consistent theory, aside from physical capital more state variables – namely
human capital, ideas, population – and also institutions as reflecting the “rules of the
game” (North 1990, 3) need to be considered. In the context of growing economies,
the important role of institutions is emphasized in the seminal work of Acemoglu et al.
(2001) and highlighted as well by, for instance, Rodrik et al. (2004).16
Altogether, within growth theory usually the platform of analysis is aggregate economies
(countries or continents) where spatial components are not explicitly considered.17 In
case they are, the notion of ‘geography’ refers to natural conditions, which include
a country’s endowment with natural resources or its climatic conditions (e.g. Gallup
et al. 1999, Dell et al. 2012). Put differently, as regards the spatial dimension, both the
models and the stressed empirical studies refer to what sometimes is called ‘first-nature
geography’, but do not make explicit man-made ‘second-nature geography’ conditions
in a territorial sense.18 The latter might, however, to some extent be understood as or
be linked to institutional settings. Especially in Section 4 we argue that the degree of
14Excellent overviews on issues related to economic growth are provided by Acemoglu (2009) – with
a special emphasis on the distinction between fundamental and proximate causes of growth – or more
broadly by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
15In detail, the Jones-Romer facts identify the following empirical regularities: (i) Increases in the
extent of the market, (ii) accelerating growth, (iii) variation in modern growth rates, (iv) large income
and total factor productivity differences, (v) increases in human capital per worker, (vi) long-run stability
of relative wages.
16Note that in many discussions and theoretical models, the concept of institutions is often connected
to the presence of property rights. Throughout this paper, however, we assume a broader interpretation
and embed institutions as regards their impact on the degree of integration – as later e.g. in Section 3
where institutions are seen as being related to the variable ‘freeness of trade’ and the environments that
allow for knowledge spillovers.
17A winged word in this context is that ‘the world is flat’, which refers to the title of a book by
Friedman (2005).
18An exception is Bosker and Garretsen (2009), who demonstrate that second-nature (or relative)
geography interpreted as the institutional quality of neighboring countries has an impact on a country’s
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integration might be interpreted as reflecting an explicit spatial dimension of institu-
tions. In addition, Jones and Romer’s (2010) stylized fact of ‘increases in the extent
of the market’ implicitly incorporates a spatial dimension, as the observed increase is
the outcome of both growth (at any place) and access to foreign markets due to global-
ization which extends the relevant market for any economy involved in (international)
trade. To conclude: Until today, spatial aspects are, if at all, only implicitly or indirectly
addressed in most models of endogenous growth.
2.3 Globalization
A glimpse at the discussion so far suggests that “agglomeration can be considered the
territorial counterpart of economic growth” (Fujita and Thisse 2002, 389). However,
this viewpoint is too simplistic and without any explanatory power as regards the un-
derlying interdependencies that drive this result given that countries or regions are not
isolated actors, but are increasingly embedded in international value-creation processes
in which due to globalization the places of production and consumption frequently are
not located within the same national borders. Globalization in this context covers sev-
eral dimensions, namely mobility of goods, people, ideas, and capital.19 The exchange
of these items is the immediate outcome of increased integration.20 Important ground-
ing in this context is given by rules that facilitate international/cross-border economic
activity like the reduction of trade barriers, reduced transportation costs or the recogni-
tion of foreign degrees. The key driver that fosters the joint emergence of growth and
agglomeration, however, is the increase in the international trade of goods (compare
Baldwin et al. 2001). Concerning mobility of people, migration mainly occurs within,
but also between countries (World Bank 2009, 147), and global migration is increasing
at least in absolute numbers. The world-wide stock of migrants has risen to 165 million
in 2000 from a starting value of 92 million in 1960, although the migrant’s share of
the world population has fallen from 3.05% to 2.71% over this period (Özden et al.
2011, 15). For migration flows, analysis by Abel and Sander (2014) suggests that for
the three 5-year periods from 1995 to 2010 a relatively stable share of approximately
0.6% of the world population has migrated internationally. With respect to the mobility
of ideas, Jones and Romer (2010, 229) note that, for instance, the change in the share
of patents granted to non-US entities by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office can be
economic development.
19The latter, for instance, via foreign direct investment (FDI). The concept may be understood even
more broadly as in the KOF Index of Globalization, which includes, amongst other things, information
on cultural proximity (see http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/).
20See Meissner (2014) for additional details on the concepts of globalization and integration.
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interpreted as an indicator for the international flow of ideas. This share has increased
from 18% in 1963 to 52% in 2012.21
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Figure 3: Globalization.
Note: World FDI over World GDP is series BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2013), and the variable World trade / World GDP is calculated
from Heston et al. (2012).
Figure 3 illustrates the phenomenon of globalization along the two dimensions ‘trade’
(mobility of goods) and ‘FDI’ (mobility of capital), which both have significantly in-
creased during the last several decades although not steadily so. The sharp drop around
the year 2000 coincides with the bursting of the dot.com bubble, and the onset of the
recent financial crisis has led to a setback in the trend towards increasing globalization.
These effects are particularly stark for the series of the ratio of World FDI to World GDP.
The increase in international trade over the past 50 years shown in Figure 3 overlaps
with a period of ongoing trade liberalization. One measure for liberalizing trade are
preferential trading agreements, and the cumulative number of these agreements in
force has increased from a value in the single digits in the early 1950s to nearly 70
21Compare the column ‘Total Patent Grants, Foreign Origin Percent Share’ under http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm. The exchange of ideas is also immensely fostered
by the fall in communication costs and the accompanying spread of the internet to which approximately
35.6% of the global population had access in 2012, whereas the corresponding shares were 0.05% in
1990 and 6.7% in 2000 (World Bank 2013; series IT.NET.USER.P2).
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in 1990 before reaching almost 300 in 2010 (World Trade Organization 2011, 54-
55).22 On a closer look, the increase in world trade over time hides an important
aspect concerning the evolution of the composition of world trade. The share of intra-
industry trade as opposed to inter-industry trade has increased as well. Brülhart (2009,
426) notes that the share of global intra-industry trade rose from roughly a quarter in
1962 to over 50% in 2006.23
A noteworthy aspect that accompanies the increasing share of intra-industry trade un-
derlying this development is the composition of this form of trade in horizontal and
vertical versions (see e.g. Thom and McDowell 1999 for this distinction). Horizontal
intra-industry trade refers to trade in differentiated products at the same processing
stage in a sector and is closely related to the love-of-variety effect that is, for example,
present in the model discussed in the subsequent section.24 Vertical intra-industry trade
on the other hand takes place within a given sector, but at different stages of processing
and is linked to comparative advantage and its resulting specialization. Distinguishing
between final and intermediate goods instead, Brülhart (2009) notes that trade in final
products has increased globally from a starting value slightly above 10% in 1962 to
roughly a third in 2006, and the corresponding series for intermediate goods has fol-
lowed the one for final goods closely until the mid 1970s, after which the shares were
consistently higher and reached about 40% in 2006.25
On a theoretical level, neoclassical international trade theory in the form of the Ricar-
dian and Heckscher-Ohlin models relies on the presence of comparative advantage due
to different technologies or relative factor abundances to explain inter-industry trade
between countries. However, neither is all trade between countries of the inter-industry
variety nor is all trade between countries that differ in income, size, and relative factor
endowments. Germany, for instance, exports cars to France and vice versa. In order to
explain this intra-industry trade that takes place even in the absence of comparative ad-
vantage various assumptions of the neoclassical trade theory need to be relaxed. This
is done in the field of new trade theory, which, for instance, no longer assumes that
firms produce with a constant returns to scale technology and operate in an environ-
22This is not to say that trade liberalization is the only or most important factor in the increase in world
trade. See Baier and Bergstrand (2001) for an analysis of the relative importance of trade liberalization,
transport costs, and other factors in this development.
23The underlying measure for intra-industry trade is the Grubel-Lloyd index at the 3-digit Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC) level. At the more detailed 5-digit SITC level intra-industry
trade has increased from ca. 10% to about 30% over the period.
24This effect is however not constrained to final goods, but is also relevant for intermediate goods or
services in firms’ production processes (Hewings and Oosterhaven 2014, 912-913).
25Data in Brülhart (2009) distinguishes only between trade in intermediate and final goods, but not
between horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade. The shares are for the 5-digit SITC level.
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ment of perfect competition. Instead, increasing returns to scale at the firm level and
imperfect competition are introduced.26 The second change concerns the assumption
of a homogeneous product in the neoclassical trade models, which is replaced in new
trade theory by heterogeneous goods which are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for
the consumers who exhibit love-of-variety preferences that are captured via a constant
elasticity of substitution function.27 The most widely adopted model of monopolis-
tic competition with these characteristics is the one introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). Notice that these assumptions also mirror the transition from neoclassical to
endogenous growth theory discussed in Subsection 2.2.
Increased freeness of trade also enhances international competition between firms and
industries and induces possible relocations of economic activity allowing for production
at the most productive places. The consequences on the spatial distribution thereby
involve two dimensions. Concerning inter-industry trade, industries that exhibit a com-
parative advantage will grow, whereas the disadvantaged industries will shrink. As re-
gards intra-industry trade, liberalization increases international competition, and some
firms are not able to cope with these conditions. Empirical studies have shown that the
corresponding reallocation of firms is more pronounced as regards intra-industry than
inter-industry trade (Brakman et al. 2009).
Analogous to the reasoning in Section 2.1, the resulting spatial equilibrium is the out-
come of the interaction between local increasing returns to scale and trade costs in
which agglomeration and dispersion forces offset each other. Reduced trade costs
(which enhance the freeness of trade) are frequently interpreted as being the outcome
of increased economic integration between formerly more or less autarkic economies.
The driving force in all these models is a reduction of trade costs or put differently,
increased integration. Trade costs are mostly argued to capture a reduction of trade
barriers such as duties or other non-tariff barriers. Major components are also trans-
portation costs that have undergone a significant decline throughout the last several
decades.28 This implicitly incorporates aspects of technological change, which allows
e.g. for an increase in shipping capacities, but also reduced communication costs that
are due to improvements of information and communications technology. Neverthe-
less, within the considered models and empirical studies the degree of integration is
assumed to be exogenous. In Section 4 we argue that integration itself undergoes an
26As Davis (1995) notes though, it is not necessary to assume increasing returns to scale at the firm
level, since intra-industry trade can be accounted for without this assumption based on comparative
advantage.
27These preferences imply that consumers receive more utility from consuming e.g. one unit each of
seven different varieties instead of seven units of one particular variety.
28The decline in costs is clearly present for air shipping, but less pronounced for ocean shipping as
Hummels (2007) notes.
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evolution together with the processes of growth and agglomeration. In order to cap-
ture the implications, integration should be related to the institutional view detailed
throughout Subsection 2.2. A more pointed view would be that integration is a funda-
mental cause for the spatial shape of the economic landscape and has explicitly to be
seen as a dynamic institution with a strong spatial dimension.
3 Model
Section 2 described a variety of stylized facts for three defining characteristics of ‘mod-
ern’ economic history: Growth, agglomeration, and integration. We detailed these
several lines of argumentation in the former part of the paper. Due to the dynamic per-
spective and the various interacting effects, their final impact on the spatial distribution
of economic activity in growing economies is far from being trivial. To provide some
guiding to disentangle the main lines of reasoning within a consistent model, this sec-
tion presents, without going deeply into its formal structure, a model by Baldwin and
Forslid (2000) that highlights the connections between these three characteristics and
thus attempts to account for the joint endogeneity of the location of industrial activity
and long-run economic growth.
Baldwin and Forslid’s starting point is the two region core-periphery model developed
by Krugman (1991), which takes care of agglomeration and integration. In this model
there exists a traditional sector with constant returns to scale and perfect competition
and an industrial sector with increasing returns to scale at the firm level, which is char-
acterized by monopolistic competition. Goods from both sectors are traded, although
trade costs occur only in the manufacturing sector. Whereas the global labor supply
and the labor supply in the traditional sector are fixed, labor in the industrial sector
is mobile, and the interregional labor distribution in this sector is determined endoge-
nously, since migration depends on differences in the real wages in the two regions.29
This model setup produces circular (cumulative) causation, which can be broken down
to three forces that ultimately depend on the degree of integration as measured by
transportation/trade costs. Two of these, the backward and forward linkages, are ag-
glomeration forces and have already been described in Subsection 2.1 under the label
market-size effects. The third force is the competition or market-crowding effect, which
works against agglomeration, as firms prefer to locate away from their competitors.
Whether or not a process of cumulative causation will be set in motion, depends on
the relative strength of these forces. If, for instance, agglomeration forces are stronger
29In a slight modification to the Krugman (1991) model, Baldwin and Forslid (2000) allow for
forward-looking behavior in the migration decision instead of static expectations.
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than the dispersion force, then a shock to the system has the result that all industrial
activity will locate in a single region, whereas the immobile factors of the traditional
sectors determine the economic power of the periphery.
Baldwin and Forslid (2000) combine this framework with the endogenous growth
model by Romer (1990) thereby incorporating the third characteristic. Both models
are built upon the Dixit-Stiglitz approach to modeling monopolistic competition (Dixit
and Stiglitz 1977) mentioned in Subsection 2.3. This identical understructure greatly
facilitates the integration of the two separate models. The new aspect in Baldwin and
Forslid’s model is to not only consider the implications of changes in the trading costs
for goods as in standard new economic geography models, but also the implications
of changes in the trading costs for ideas. New ideas or knowledge are the driving
force of economic growth in the model, and they ultimately show up in the form of an
increasing number of varieties produced in the monopolistically competitive manufac-
turing sector. Producing a new variety requires a fixed cost of one unit of capital K in
the model in addition to a variable cost for labor. Capital in this model is viewed as
“new knowledge embedded in a manufacturing facility that is immobile across regions”
(Baldwin and Forslid 2000, 310). Production of capital requires only labor as an input
and takes place in the model’s third sector, the investment good or innovation sector,
which is characterized by perfect competition. The crucial feature of this sector is the
presence of knowledge spillovers or technological externalities in the sense that the
unit labor requirement falls with an increasing level of production in the investment
good sector. The specific distribution of manufacturing activity over the two regions
moreover has a bearing on the extent of knowledge spillovers. More precisely, knowl-
edge accumulated in a given region, e.g. the north, is more beneficial to firms in the
north than knowledge accumulated in the south. This specification receives empirical
support by, for instance, the work by Eaton and Kortum (1996, 276), who demonstrate
for the OECD that even though there is substantial diffusion of technology between
countries, large impediments to its diffusions exist that “are sufficient to generate large
differences in productivity across countries.” Put differently, location matters for firm
productivity.
Baldwin and Forslid formally model production in the innovation sector via the follow-
ing production function:
QK(t) =
LI
aI(t)
; aI(t) =
1
K(t−1)+λK∗(t−1) ; 0≤ λ≤ 1
in which the variable QK(t) denotes the flow of new capital at time t, and employment
in the investment sector is denoted by LI. K and K∗ are capital in the north and south,
respectively, and the parameter λ signifies the degree of knowledge spillovers. The
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one-period lag, t− 1, for the capital in the two regions in the expression for the unit
labor requirement in the investment goods sector, aI(t), indicates that it takes a certain
amount of time until knowledge produced in one region becomes available in the other
region.30
A complete analytical derivation of the results in Baldwin and Forslid (2000) is outside
the scope of this article. Suffice it to say at this point that the model’s dynamics can
be completely described by a system of three difference equations in the variables for
labor in the north, L(t), the north’s share of global capital, K(t)/
(
K(t)+K∗(t)
)≡ θK(t),
and the shadow value of migration, W (t). As in the standard core-periphery model,
three stable long-run equilibria exist:31 One in which manufacturing activity is spread
symmetrically between the north and the south, and in the other two equilibria man-
ufacturing activity is either completely agglomerated in the north or the south. The
stability of these equilibria is verified via an analysis of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix of the system of difference equations linearized around the steady state under
consideration.
Despite the fact that the model is analytically rather complex, it has the neat feature that
the stability properties of the respective equilibria depend only on two parameters. One
is the already mentioned λ, denoting the degree of knowledge spillovers. The higher its
value, the less localized are the technological externalities. Hence, this parameter can
be interpreted as representing the cost of trading information. The second parameter,
φ, is an index capturing the notion of freeness of trade and can be shown to vary
between 0 and 1.32 This specification makes it possible to summarize information on
the stability of the equilibria in the comparatively simple diagram shown in Figure 4,
which is divided into three sections.
Analysis of Figure 4 shows that the results from the standard core-periphery model of
the Krugman variety carry over to the growth-augmented model. A fall in transport
costs (equivalently a higher value for φ) has the implication that agglomeration be-
comes the only stable equilibrium.33 This process is illustrated by the horizontal line
with the three arrows in Figure 4. For a high enough level of knowledge spillovers, the
economy moves from a situation in which only the symmetric equilibrium is stable (Sec-
tion I) through a situation in which both agglomeration and the symmetric equilibrium
are stable (Section II) to one in which only agglomeration is a stable equilibrium (Sec-
30Baldwin and Forslid (2000, 313) take one period to last approximately 10 years.
31Additional unstable interior equilibria exist as well.
32For infinitely high trade costs the index is zero, whereas in the absence of trade costs it equals one.
33Note that Figure 4 only establishes that agglomeration is a stable equilibrium, but not which region
is or becomes the core. To determine this, the initial conditions and the specific shock that disturbs an
unstable equilibrium need to be analyzed.
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Figure 4: Stability of the equilibria in dependence on λ and φ.
tion III). This destabilizing aspect (in the sense of a tendency towards agglomeration)
of closer integration is linked to the presence of an additional agglomeration force due
to the introduction of endogenous growth into the model. However, the presence of
knowledge spillovers influences the strength of this third circular causation chain and
Baldwin and Forslid (2000) indicate that the strength of this effect can be counteracted
by the model’s second policy parameter, λ. Hence, combining a lowering of the costs
of trading goods with a lowering of the costs of trading ideas opens up the possibility
that the symmetric equilibrium remains stable for a wider range of values for φ. This
possibility is shown by the dashed arrow moving from Section I to Section II.
It is also possible that a policy that lowers the costs of trading information sufficiently,
leads to a spreading out of industrial activity. In Figure 4 this is captured by a ‘world’
economy starting in point A in a core-periphery equilibrium, which then becomes more
integrated through higher knowledge spillovers and moves to point D in which only
spreading is a stable equilibrium.
Therefore, integration needs to be viewed as a more complex process than in standard
new economic geography models and embrace aside from mobility of goods and people
also mobility of ideas and capital. Ever closer integration through a given reduction in
the costs of trading goods does not necessarily lead to complete agglomeration. This
process can be counteracted (compare a movement along the dashed arrow or from
point A to C with a policy that moved the world economy from A to B) and possibly
even reversed34 through adequate policies that lead to a fall in the costs of trading
34Consider a situation in which both regions are living in autarky, introduce some free trade which
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information. Note that although integration is now more broadly specified than in the
standard new economic geography model, it is still specified as an exogenous and static
concept.
4 Size vs. scale: When, where, and why does it matter?
The considerations so far have mainly been focussed at a highly aggregate level, be
it the arbitrarily chosen global regions highlighted within the empirical presentations
in Figures 1 and 2, the world-wide view in Figure 3 or the economy-wide perspective
assumed within the discussed theories in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 as well as within
Section 3 and Figure 4. Besides, it is nearby to assume that the aggregation level also
determines the size of the considered economy. Benefits of large economies arise e.g. as
size co-determines the financial, political, business and cultural environments of people
and firms. One example is the provision of public goods like national defense, public
security, or the judicial system, for which the costs in larger nations can be spread over
more taxpayers. Further benefits of large countries are insurance against asymmetric
regional shocks35 or the possibility of nation-wide redistribution schemes that affect the
after-tax income distribution in a way not feasible if the territories were independent
entities (Alesina and Spolaore 2003, 3-4). Counteracting these positive effects of size
are more heterogeneous preferences in larger countries, leading to a higher probability
that some subset of regions (or individuals) in a nation is not in agreement with the
policies of the central government and thus poses a danger to its stability (Alesina
and Spolaore 2003, 4-5). Ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity play a role in
this context. More prosaically, administrative costs may rise with ever larger size and
issues of congestion, crime, and pollution may become a problem. It is thus nearby
to assume that there is some endogenously resulting ‘optimal’ size of economic spaces,
which differs according to their respective characteristics and evolves as production
conditions, dynamic environments, or institutional settings (especially of interest are
the rules underlying international trade or knowledge diffusion) change.
That size per se is not necessarily beneficial as regards prosperity is confirmed if one
takes a more precise look at empirical regularities. Less aggregated data suggests e.g.
moves the world economy to point E where the core-periphery equilibrium is stable and then drasti-
cally reduce the cost of trading information so that the world economy ends up in point D where only
spreading is a stable equilibrium.
35Just to mention one example: The lack of such an insurance in the Eurozone during the recent eco-
nomic crisis has inhibited the recovery dramatically. Adversely affected US states, for instance, received
federal transfers from their ‘stronger’ counterparts, whereas such fiscal transfers (e.g. from Germany to
Spain) were not possible within the monetary union of the Eurozone as it is not a fiscal union.
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that out of the twenty countries with the largest population only four (USA, Russia,
Japan, and Germany) belong to the group of high-income economies according to the
World Bank’s classification.36 Contrariwise, the mentioned high-income group includes
countries with a relatively small population like Singapore, Luxembourg or Iceland.
A similar result holds for selected US states. Out of the top ten according to popula-
tion, only New York is also in the top ten with respect to per capita income. On the
other hand, small states like New Hampshire are relatively rich.37 Prosperous regions
at different sizes have at various times included, for example, agglomerations in north-
western Europe for the continental scale, the Ruhr district in Germany for the country
scale, or the city state of Hamburg in northern Germany on the local scale. Even at
the city level, more and less prosperous districts might be observed.38 From a dynamic
perspective (i.e. focussing on the growth rate and not on the level of GDP per capita)
OECD data for the second half of the 20th century at the country level also suggests
that there is no conclusive evidence of a unique and positive relationship between GDP
growth and measures of scale (compare e.g. Jones (1995a,b) or Backus et al. (1992)).39
The discussed ambiguity of the empirical studies is also mirrored within growth theory,
which considers both the level but especially the growth rate of GDP per capita. An
important class of growth models exhibits scale effects in the sense that variations in
the size or scale of the economy permanently alter the long-run equilibrium growth rate
per capita.40 Within these models the relationship between scale and growth is unique –
thereby contradicting the previously discussed empirical ambiguity – and depends upon
both the existence and the nature of production externalities (e.g. via the provision of
productive public inputs or various sorts of spillovers). This class of models, however,
has strong formal requirements leading to restrictive knife-edge assumptions that have
to be fulfilled in order to allow for long-run equilibrium growth.41 Both the theoretical
and empirical limitations of the mentioned models have led to the formulation of so-
36An overview of the classification scheme can be found here: http://data.worldbank.org/about/
country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups.
37See the ‘State and County QuickFacts’ dataset available under: http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/download_data.html.
38Compare e.g. for Karlsruhe the two districts of almost identical size ‘Südweststadt’ and ‘Oststadt’
with the former being relatively prosperous and the latter being inhabited by poorer individuals.
39Over an extraordinary long time frame though, beginning in 1,000,000 B.C., Kremer (1993) finds
support for the hypothesis of a positive link between population growth and economic growth. Notice
that this long-run time scale includes the transition of various organizational forms of economic activity
from hunter-gatherer over subsistence to nowadays industrialized economies.
40Examples are the models of Romer (1990) or Barro (1990); compare e.g. Turnovsky (2000, chap 14)
for a comprehensive overview.
41These assumptions include constant returns to scale to rivalrous factors to allow for competitive
factor markets. See Solow (1994) and Dalgaard and Kreiner (2003) for more on this.
19
called non-scale growth models, i.e. models that exhibit equilibrium growth rates that
are not subject to scale effects in spite of endogenously accumulated production factors
and the existence of externalities. However, those models suffer from other limitations,
e.g. they exhibit special stability characteristics together with transitional dynamics and
hence are again only suited to explain details of the complex growth story, but not to
resolve the aforediscussed tensions.42 One might summarize that there is no clear-cut
evidence on the relationship between size and prosperity neither as regards theory nor
the empirical analyses. Thus it is also not clear how integration that alters the size of
a considered economy affects wealth. This is a strong indicator for the fact that not
all relevant aspects have been addressed yet to understand the relationship between
agglomeration, growth, and integration and how their respective interdependencies
and feedbacks shape the economic landscape.
One starting point for further thoughts consists in following the line of reasoning of
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, 82), who argue that “whether country size matters for
economic prosperity depends on a country’s degree of integration with the rest of the
world.” This is a quite plausible argument, since, for instance, small countries like Lux-
embourg or Switzerland (0.5m and 7.5m inhabitants, respectively) dispose of intensive
trade relations and are well embedded in international value-creation networks. At the
same time, land-locked countries of larger size as e.g. Uzbekistan (27.5m inhabitants),
but with little access to world markets, are less prosperous.43
Though the argument of Alesina and Spolaore again starts at a national level, it is
nearby to relax this perspective and to analyze the role of integration for prosperity and
agglomeration also at a less aggregated level. It is conceivable that size may not matter
for productivity at an aggregate level, but be quite relevant at a regional scale thereby
relying on externalities associated with proximity-productivity linkages. It furthermore
clarifies that the notion of scale (in the sense of size) has to be distinguished from scale
effects, and one has to be precise by using the different wording.
Scale may thus not simply be used as a synonym for population size. From the perspec-
tive of the production conditions, scale effects are especially linked to market forms44
or various sorts of externalities as determinants of ongoing growth.45 From a firm
42See Turnovsky (2000), Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) for more
details on scale and non-scale models of growth.
43In 2010 GDP per capita in Switzerland was more than four times the respective value for Uzbekistan
(Bolt and van Zanden 2013). The population numbers are also for 2010 and are taken from United
Nations (2012, Table A.5).
44An example is the necessity of constant returns to scale of the private factor inputs so that competi-
tive factor remunerations are guaranteed.
45A detailed overview on different scale effects is provided by the World Bank (2009, 128) in Table 4.1
entitled ‘A dozen economies of scale’.
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perspective, usually internal and external economies of scale are distinguished. The
optimal firm size is reached whenever firms fully exploit existing internal economies
of scale. In addition, there exist external economies of scale, and both scale effects in
conjunction determine whether or not a firm decides to relocate. In this context, in par-
ticular firms that dispose of production conditions characterized by increasing returns
to scale and the associated spillovers are important drivers for regional development.
Nailing these thoughts down to a spatial component, it seems quite plausible to as-
sume that e.g. knowledge flows are easier realized in places where more people are
concentrated. Economies of scale are then rather linked to the idea of density than to
mere size. It is thus important through which channel integration acts: Does it enhance
the mere number of actors within the economy (scale) or does it affect their way of
interaction (scale effects)?
In what follows we argue that integration can and should be understood in a much
broader sense than just a reduction of trade costs and also cover, as argued within the
model presented in Section 3, the impact of knowledge spillovers. It affects the envi-
ronment of the firms in the sense that it has the power to transform size into density the
latter being quite well an agglomeration force. In doing so, integration is especially apt
to activate latent agglomeration and dispersion forces thereby shaping the economic
landscape at various levels of aggregation. Besides, integration may be deployed more
effectively as an agglomeration force if it can build upon a solid institutional base.
So far, the role of institutions has been discussed as a fundamental cause of economic
growth both within and across economies. Our approach exactly starts at this point and
argues that the design of integration pins down the impact of institutions to a spatial
dimension and may thereby alter the effective economic scale. This might be justified
as follows: Integration affects both the size of the relevant market and the effectiveness
of local increasing returns to scale. It thereby has the power to act as a major agglom-
eration force and thus has an impact on the spatial structure of economic activity at
different levels of aggregation. Being more precise, integration may alter various re-
turns to scale relevant for an individual firm. It acts via two separate channels. On the
one hand, as it enhances the mobility of goods, people, capital, and ideas, integration,
in the sense of higher freeness of trade also increases the size of the relevant market.
On the other hand, it also affects the firms’ environmental conditions, especially with
respect to density as integration also impacts on knowledge spillovers. Formerly latent
economies of scale might become active at a firm level, if, as a consequence of inte-
gration, a region becomes more dense. In sum, integration is not just an additional
argument accompanying the agglomeration-growth nexus, but across time it is the key
driver of spatial concentration in growing economies. It especially becomes powerful
not only as an enabler but also as a magnifier of scale effects.
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We conclude that although the empirical regularities discussed in Section 2 and the
presented theory in Section 3 are strong indicators for a co-evolution of urbanization
and growth, spatial scaling (in the sense of zooming in from continental over national
and regional to even city level) together with a differentiated analysis of the impact of
integration both requires and allows for a more sophisticated view.
One caveat concerns the missing linkage between scale and institutions and how these
are related to space; another concerns the dynamics and endogeneity of institutions.
There is a large discussion on the role of national and regional innovation systems
that deals with institutional and organizational dimensions that already address the
evolution of institutions within dynamic economies. The analysis, however, is carried
out mostly within isolated economies (compare e.g. Cooke et al. (1997)). Analogous
reasonings as regards the institutional embedding of integration and its feedback on
diverse levels of aggregation are still far from being understood in depth. What most
theories do so far is an analysis of how static and exogenously given levels of integration
affect the dynamic concepts of agglomeration and growth. However, the corresponding
feedback link from agglomeration and growth on the evolution of integration and its
interpretation as an institution that is shaped by those economies that are linked via
integration is missing. But these considerations are mandatory to understand integra-
tion as a dynamic and endogenous concept that is linked to space. In what follows
we go even one step further and argue that if we interpret integration as a dynamic
spatial institution, the concept and its design become a fundamental cause not only
for growth but also for agglomeration on which economic policy has a large impact.
The corresponding policy implications therefore have to accommodate these various
interdependencies.
5 Policy implications
The previous sections have presented a multitude of empirical facts on the issues of
growth, urbanization, and globalization and explored the connections between these
also on a theoretical level before the matters of size and scale and the role integration
plays herein have been discussed more deeply. Implications for policy have so far been
delegated to the background.
Which policy implications can be derived from the Baldwin and Forslid (2000) model?
Naturally, these depend on the particular objectives set by policy makers and how they
relate these objectives to overall welfare. For instance, a preference for a symmetric
outcome46 can be achieved by adjusting the policy variables for the costs of trading
46Perhaps inspired by the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which tasks the Federation
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goods and information adequately. However, as long as one neglects arguments of
redistribution, such an objective contrasts with the goal of maximizing overall real in-
come. The technological externalities in the innovation sector imply that agglomeration
of economic activity is growth enhancing in the sense that more varieties are produced
if all manufacturing activity is located in a single region (unless λ = 1). Workers in
every region and sector gain from this increased number of varieties via the love-of-
variety effect. This dynamic gain needs to be seen alongside the static welfare loss for
consumers in the periphery’s traditional sector, which arises since these workers have
to import all manufactured varieties, leading to a higher price index in the peripheral
region (for φ< 1). Baldwin and Forslid (2000) demonstrate that the dynamic gains can
only mitigate, but not compensate the welfare losses for the workers in the periphery’s
traditional sector. Hence, starting from a symmetric equilibrium no clear-cut policy im-
plications exist, which lead to a Pareto improvement. The presence of the externality
moreover implies that, as in standard expanding-variety growth models, the decen-
tralized growth rate in the Baldwin and Forslid (2000) model is not Pareto optimal.
Combining completely free trade (i.e. φ= 1) with, for instance, a subsidy to production
in the innovation sector would be an example for a policy that leads to the socially op-
timal growth rate and, assuming the starting point is the symmetric equilibrium, brings
about a Pareto improvement for all workers (Baldwin and Forslid 2000, 323). As de-
scribed above, building upon an institutional foundation, policies for closer integration
become more important in the process of development. Along the lines of the model in
Section 3, these fall into two categories: Integrating policies that lead to lower costs of
trading goods and integrating policies that lower the costs of trading information. That
tighter integration brings immense benefits is highlighted by e.g. Eaton and Kortum
(1996, Table 5), who note that for all OECD countries except the US the majority of the
contribution to productivity growth comes from abroad.
Taking a step back from the model, it is evident that economic activity is spatially con-
centrated.47 This need not imply differences in living standards between regions in
which economic activity is concentrated and regions in which it is not even though it
can – the relationship resembles an inverted U over the course of economic develop-
ment (World Bank 2009, 74) and can be interpreted as a variant of a ‘Kuznets curve’.48
In reaction to this situation many policy makers pursue the goal of convergence of liv-
with the “establishment of equivalent living conditions throughout the federal territory” (see http://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/).
47For just an additional illustration of the global situation see for example: http://gecon.yale.edu/
large-pixeled-contour-globe.
48The relationship considered here is not quite the same as the one for the original Kuznets curve,
which considered interpersonal income inequality instead of spatial inequality, though the underlying
reasoning is the same for both curves (World Bank 2009, 293).
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ing standards as measured by GDP per capita. The European Union, for instance, tries
to promote this goal by allocating a significant share of its funds for cohesion policy
for the period 2014-2020 to economically lagging regions.49 It is important to keep in
mind here that pursuing economic convergence of regions does not imply striving for
an equal spatial distribution of economic activity, as this would prevent regions from
benefiting from agglomeration economies with possible negative repercussions on ag-
gregate economic performance.50
According to the World Bank (2009, e.g. 41), economic integration is expected to re-
solve the tension between the fact of concentration and the objective of convergence.
However, the utilized concept of integration is fuzzy, and the corresponding policy im-
plications need to be differentiated according to the scale at which the policies are ap-
plied as well as to a country’s level of development thereby taking an implicit dynamic
perspective, which also addresses the evolution of integration and thus represents a
dynamic concept. Such an approach allows taking into consideration the relative im-
portance of the various agglomeration economies over the course of development and
furthermore means that policies that aim at integration within or between cities differ
from policies intended to integrate regions or nations.
Consider, for example, the policies the World Bank (2009, 229) advocates for an ur-
banization strategy that explicitly aims at increasing density in order to foster benefits
from the proximity-productivity linkage. The report categorizes territories according
to their level of urbanization. Given incipient urbanization, characterized by a share
of the urban population of less than 25%, density is comparatively low so that policy
makers’ objective should be to enable the aforementioned agglomeration economies. In
addition, at this stage of development there is room for individual plants and firms to
more fully exploit internal returns to scale. However, the choice of policy instrument is
important. Policy makers, for instance, face a risk of favoring one place or industry over
another by spatially targeted interventions, whereas markets may assess the situation
in a different light. This may lead to inefficient economic structures, which may persist
over time. Hence, a strategy avoiding such an outcome would place emphasis on estab-
lishing adequate institutions like secure property rights in land markets and provision
of basic social services for health and education without applying a spatial focus. This
aspect remains important in areas with intermediate urbanization shares of about 50%.
49Defined for this purpose as regions with a GDP per capita less than 75% of the EU-27 average.
See the European Union’s Regional Policy website for more detailed information: http://ec.europa.
eu/regional_policy/index_en.cfm. At the national level in Germany, the federal financial equaliza-
tion system (Länderfinanzausgleich) indirectly pursues a similar objective by utilizing a large budget to
redistribute money from prosperous to weaker federal states.
50The example of the industrial policy in the former Soviet Union has demonstrated the problems
with such an approach (World Bank 2009, 256).
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Firms located in these areas are embedded in various emerging networks where co-
operation arises both within and between different places. Through the co-location of
firms in the same or closely related sectors these firms benefit from localization (MAR)
externalities, which lead to increasing returns to scale within the considered region.
The promotion of these agglomeration economies should be high on the policy makers’
agenda in these regions, but not the only item on it. Investments in infrastructure are
important as well in order to ease congestion and to better integrate people and places.
These policies continue to be relevant for areas of advanced urbanization where around
75% of the population live in urban areas. Benefits in these areas arise mostly from
urbanization economies dating back to Jacobs (1969) and which point to diversity and
intense economic activity. ‘Livability’ is the watchword from the World Bank (2009,
201) for these areas, and this could be reflected in polices that try to reduce crime and
pollution or provide amenities.
Policies should thus reflect that as an economy evolves, it passes from states with
constant returns to scale through states characterized by specialization/localization
economies to states of urbanization economies. Throughout this process of transforma-
tion, frequently internal economies of scale turn into external economies, which then
simultaneously act as agglomeration forces for those being located in close proximity.
This argument is especially intuitive for growing agglomerations where development
prepares the ground for the gradual evolution of clusters, which on their own are spe-
cialized, but which – given sufficient size – due to their interaction finally also allow for
diversification. Integration plays a major role herein.
6 Conclusion
Agglomeration, economic growth, and integration are three main aspects that charac-
terize recent world economic history. This article has highlighted the relevant empirical
facts on these and summarized how they relate to each other by presenting a model by
Baldwin and Forslid (2000) that combines two seminal models from the endogenous
growth (Romer 1990) and new economic geography literature (Krugman 1991). A
non-formal analysis of the combined model has shown that lowering the costs of infor-
mation tends to weaken the agglomeration force that is set in motion by a lowering of
trade costs. Despite these important insights, the treatment of integration in this model
is still on a very rough level.
The issue of scale in its various guises and how it is affected via integration has re-
ceived particular attention. It has been demonstrated that the presence of agglomera-
tion economies possibly depends on the level of aggregation (continent, nation, region,
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city, district). Analyzing this issue in more depth and investigating the presence of pos-
sible threshold effects seems to be worthwhile. Major weaknesses are that the degree
of integration is exogenously given in most analyses and thus does not allow neither for
economic development nor structural change or spatial scaling. Especially in dynamic
economies where the economic landscape is shaped by the interactions of growth and
agglomeration such a perspective of integration is much too simplistic. Integration in a
comprehensive sense goes far beyond being the mere enabler and magnifier of mobility
of various items. It also implies changes in the organization of economic processes at a
spatial scale as it changes the way in which different agents in a system relate to each
other. The design of integration thus complements respective institutional settings of
interacting territories. Due to the dynamic environments, also integration itself evolves
and becomes a dynamic and endogenous concept. Future research thus requires a far
more precise view on the endogenous determination and evolution of integration and
how this interacts within supra-national, national and regional institutional settings
thereby shaping the economic landscape. Integration should be clearer understood as
a process that itself undergoes dynamic changes, too. As the economy evolves, also
the design of the prevailing integration mechanism has to be continuously adjusted. In
doing so, the respective level of agglomeration at which integration becomes active has
to be considered as well as the dynamic characteristics of the investigated economic
spaces.
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A List of geographic entities
A list of countries and entities sorted into the various regions in Figures 1 and 2 accord-
ing to the classification in the New Maddison Project Database is given below.
Table A.1: Countries aggregated into major geographical regions according to the classification in
the New Maddison Project Database.
Africa: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoro Islands, Côte
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bis-
sau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Maurita-
nia, Mauritius, Mayotte, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nige-
ria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Sao Tomé & Principe,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swazi-
land, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Western Sahara, Zambia, Zim-
babwe
Asia: Afghanistan, American Samoa, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei,
Burma, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, East Timor, Fiji, French Poly-
nesia, Guam, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan,
Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives,
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, New Caledonia,
North Korea, Northern Mariana Islands, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, South Korea, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sin-
gapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga,
Turkey, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Wallis and For-
tuna, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen
Latin America: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barba-
dos, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Is-
lands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Pierre and
Miquelon, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and To-
bago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands, Uruguay,
Venezuela
Western Europe: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Faeroe Islands, Finland,
France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Guernsey, Iceland, Ire-
land, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom
27
References
Abel, G. J. and Sander, N.: 2014, Quantifying global international migration flows,
Science 343(6178), 1520–1522.
Acemoglu, D.: 2009, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth, Princeton University
Press.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A.: 2001, The colonial origins of compar-
ative development: An empirical investigation, American Economic Review 91, 1369–
1401.
Alesina, A. and Spolaore, E.: 2003, The Size of Nations, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Arrow, K. J.: 1962, The economic implications of learning by doing, The Review of
Economic Studies 29, 155–173.
Backus, D. K., Kehoe, P. J. and Kehoe, T. J.: 1992, In search of scale effects in trade and
growth, Journal of Economic Theory 58, 377–409.
Baier, S. L. and Bergstrand, J. H.: 2001, The growth of world trade: tariffs, transport
costs, and income similarity, Journal of International Economics 53, 1–27.
Bairoch, P.: 1988, Cities and Economic Development - From the Dawn of History to the
Present, Mansell Publishing Limited.
Baldwin, R. E. and Forslid, R.: 2000, The core-periphery model and endogenous
growth: Stabilizing and destabilizing integration, Economica 67, 307–324.
Baldwin, R. E., Martin, P. and Ottaviano, Gianmarco, I. P.: 2001, Global income diver-
gence, trade, and industrialization: The geography of growth take-offs, Journal of
Economic Growth 6, 5–37.
Barro, R. J.: 1990, Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth,
Journal of Political Economy 98, 103–125.
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X.: 2004, Economic Growth, 2 edn, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Bolt, J. and van Zanden, J. L.: 2013, The first update of the Maddison Project; re-
estimating growth before 1820, Maddison Project Working Paper 4.
Bosker, M. and Garretsen, H.: 2009, Economic development and the geography of
institutions, Journal of Economic Geography 9, 295–328.
28
Brakman, S., Garretsen, H. and van Marrewijk, C.: 2009, The New Introduction to
Geographical Economics, 2 edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK.
Brakman, S. and van Marrewijk, C.: 2008, It’s a big world after all: on the economic
impact of location and distance, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society
1, 411–437.
Brülhart, M.: 2009, An account of global intra-industry trade, 1962-2006, The World
Economy 32(3), 401–459.
Cooke, P., Uranga, M. G. and Etxebarria, G.: 1997, Regional innovation systems: Insti-
tutional and organisational dimensions, Research Policy 26, 475–491.
Dalgaard, C.-J. and Kreiner, C. T.: 2003, Endogenous growth: A knife edge or the
razor’s edge?, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105(1), 73–85.
Davis, D. R.: 1995, Intra-industry trade: A Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo approach, Journal
of International Economics 39, 201–226.
Dell, M., Jones, B. F. and Olken, B. A.: 2012, Temperature shocks and economic growth:
Evidence from the last half century, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
4(3), 66–95.
Dixit, A. K. and Stiglitz, J.: 1977, Monopolistic competition and optimum product
diversity, American Economic Review 67, 297–308.
Duranton, G. and Puga, D.: 2000, Diversity and specialisation in cities: Why, where
and when does it matter?, Urban Studies 37(3), 533–555.
Eaton, J. and Kortum, S.: 1996, Trade in ideas: Patenting and productivity in the OECD,
Journal of International Economics 40, 251–278.
Eicher, T. S. and Turnovsky, S. J.: 1999, Non-scale models of economic growth, The
Economic Journal 109, 394–415.
Eicher, T. and Turnovsky, S.: 2000, Scale, congestion and growth, Economica 67, 325–
346.
Friedman, T. L.: 2005, The World is Flat - A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century,
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Fujita, M. and Thisse, J.-F.: 2002, Economics of Agglomeration: Cities, Regions, and
International Trade, MIT Press.
29
Gabaix, X. and Ioannides, Y. M.: 2004, The evolution of city size distributions, in J. Hen-
derson and J. Thisse (eds), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Vol. 4, Else-
vier B.V.
Gallup, J. L., Sachs, J. D. and Mellinger, A. D.: 1999, Geography and economic devel-
opment, International Regional Science Review 22(2), 179–232.
Galor, O.: 2005, From stagnation to growth: Unified growth theory, in P. Aghion and
S. N. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1A, Elsevier B.V., chapter 4.
Galor, O.: 2011, Unified Growth Theory, Princeton University Press.
Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B.: 2012, Penn World Table Version 7.1, Center
for International Comparison of Production, Income and Prices at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Hewings, G. J. D. and Oosterhaven, J.: 2014, Interregional trade models, in M. M.
Fischer and P. Nijkamp (eds), Handbook of Regional Science, Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg, chapter 46, pp. 903–925.
Hummels, D.: 2007, Transportation costs and international trade in the second era of
globalization, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3), 131–154.
Jacobs, J.: 1969, The Economy of Cities, Random House, New York.
Jones, C. I.: 1995a, R&D-based models of economic growth, The Journal of Political
Economy 103(4), 759–784.
Jones, C. I.: 1995b, Time series tests of endogenous growth models, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 110(2), 495–525.
Jones, C. I. and Romer, P. M.: 2010, The new Kaldor facts: Ideas, institutions, popula-
tion, and human capital, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(1), 224–245.
Kaldor, N.: 1957, A model of economic growth, Economic Journal 67(268), 591–624.
Kaldor, N.: 1961, Capital accumulation and economic growth, in F. A. Lutz and D. C.
Hague (eds), The Theory of Capital, St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp. 177–222.
Kremer, M.: 1993, Population growth and technological change: One million B.C. to
1990, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3), 681–716.
Krugman, P.: 1991, Increasing returns and economic geography, Journal of Political
Economy 99, 483–499.
30
Krugman, P. E.: 1998, What’s new about the new economic geogrpahy?, Oxford Review
of Economic Policy 14(2), 7–17.
Marshall, A.: 1890, Principles of Economics, Macmillan, London.
Meissner, C. M.: 2014, Growth from globalization? A view from the very long run, in
P. Aghion and S. N. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 2B, Elsevier
B.V., chapter 8, pp. 1033–1069.
North, D.: 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Özden, Ç., Parsons, C. R., Schiff, M. and Walmsley, T. L.: 2011, Where on Earth is
everybody? The evolution of global bilateral migration 1960-2000, The World Bank
Economic Review 25(2), 12–56.
Porter, M. E.: 1990, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Macmillan, New York.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F.: 2004, Institutions rule: The primacy of
institutions over geography and integration in economic development, Journal of
Economic Growth 9, 131–165.
Romer, P. M.: 1986, Increasing returns and long-run growth, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 94, 1002–1037.
Romer, P. M.: 1990, Endogenous technological change, The Journal of Political Economy
98(5), S71–S102.
Solow, R. M.: 1956, A contribution to the theory of economic growth, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 70(1), 65–94.
Solow, R. M.: 1994, Perspectives on growth theory, Journal of Economic Perspectives
8(1), 45–54.
Swan, T. W.: 1956, Economic growth and capital accumulation, The Economic Record
32(2), 334–361.
Thom, R. and McDowell, M.: 1999, Measuring marginal intra-industry trade,
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 135(1), 48–61.
Turnovsky, S. J.: 2000, Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2 edn, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge/Mass.
31
Uchida, H. and Nelson, A.: 2010, Agglomeration index: Towards a new measure of
urban concentration, Working Paper 2010/29, World Institute for Development Eco-
nomic Research.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: 2012,
World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision, Final Report with Annex Tables, New
York.
World Bank: 2009, World Develoment Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography,
World Bank.
World Bank: 2013, World Development Indicators, World Bank.
World Trade Organization: 2011, World Trade Report 2011 – The WTO and preferential
trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence, World Trade Organization.
32
No. 59
No. 58
No. 57
No. 56
No. 55
No. 54
No. 53
No. 52
No. 51
No. 50
No. 49
No. 48
Tim Deeken and Ingrid Ott: Integration as a spatial institution: Implica-
tions for agglomeration and growth, July 2014
Mher Safarian: Erhaltungsgesetze für das Modell Mr |Gr |1 | ∞ in der Klas-
se der konservativen Abfertigungsdisziplinen, July 2014
Marten Hillebrand: Existence of bubbly equilibria in overlapping genera-
tions models with stochastic production, June 2014
Mher Safarian: Hedging options including transaction costs in incomplete 
markets, April 2014
Aidas Masiliunas, Friederike Mengel, J. Philipp Reiss: Behavioral variation 
in Tullock contests, February 2014
Antje Schimke: Aging workforce and firm growth in the context of 
„extreme“ employment growth events, January 2014
Florian Kreuchauff and Nina Teichert: Nanotechnology as general
purpose technology, January 2014
Mher Safarian: On portfolio risk estimation, December 2013
Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato, Clemens Puppe: The Condorcet set: majori-
ty voting over interconnected propositions, December 2013
Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato, Clemens Puppe: Unanimity overruled: ma-
jority voting and the burden of history, December 2013
Andranik S. Tangian: Decision making in politics and economics: 5. 2013 
election to German Bundestag and direct democracy, December 2013
Marten Hillebrand, Tomoo Kikuchi, Masaya Sakuragawa: Bubbles and 
crowding-in of capital via a savings glut, November 2013
recent issues
Working Paper Series in Economics
The responsibility for the contents of the working papers rests with the author, not the Institute. Since working papers 
are of a preliminary nature, it may be useful to contact the author of a particular working paper about results or ca-
veats before referring to, or quoting, a paper. Any comments on working papers should be sent directly to the author.
